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FOREWORD 
Our foreign trade is at present. badly , disrupted. A 
tariff crisis is today strangling international trade. Do-
mestic farm prices show the consequences. In agricul-
ture bankruptcy has become well-nigh universal. At the 
same time our debtors abroad, both public and private, 
are forced to default. The loss of the foreign markets, 
moreover, lias destroyed the fundamental balance be-
tween agriculture and industry in our national economic 
life. 
There are, however, several correctives at work mend-
ing the fabric of foreign trade. But it is important to 
observe that the burden of these correctives falls with 
ruthless severity upon the American farmer. In sub-
stance, the adjustments now taking place in foreign trade 
are simply reducing the exports of commodities from 
the United States enough to balance our international in-
coming and outgoing payments to fit our creditor position. 
What, then, can be done to relieve this undue pressure 
on American agriculture T This circular is essentially an 
examination of the only principal alternative, namely, the 
lowering of our tariff wall.· The consequences of tariff 
adjustments, as a means of restoring our foreign trade, 
· are considered in this study. 
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the basic 
analysis set forth in Circular 146 (No. VIII of this 
series), "How Tariffs Affect Farm Prices," because it is 
important to understand hoiv the creditor position of the 
United States bears upon foreign trade and the whole 
problem· of tariffs. 
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Since the World War the United States has become the sec-
ond greatest creditor nation in the world. The amount of 
American capital invested abroad is indeed gigantic. Large 
interest and sinking fund payments are annually due Ameri-
can citizens. These payments make it necessary for the United 
States to import more commodities and services than it ex-
ports. Additional foreign loans can only postpone this ad-
justment. It is an inescapable fact in international trade that 
a mature' creditor nation cannot sell as much to other coun-
tries as it is obliged to take from them. 
LESS EXPORTS OR MORE IMPORTS 
There are essentially two ways by which this adjustment 
in our foreign trade can be made. 'Ve may either decrease our 
exports or increase imports. Naturally, a combination of the 
two is also possible. 
For a long time we have looked upon ourselves as an ex-
porting country, and rightly so. Since 1874 American trade 
has been marked by an export trade balance. The value of 
exports exceeded imports; we sold more goods to foreigners 
than we took from them. · 
Up until the World War our trade balance reflected our 
debtor position. We were a mature debtor country. We had 
borrowed more capital from abroad than any other country. 
In order to make interest and sinking fund payments to for-
eign citizens it was necessary for us to export more than we 
imported. It is estimated that at the time of the outbreak 
of the World War Americans were paying about $200,000,000 
a year to Europeans for the use of capital. In contrailt, the 
principal creditor countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
pre-war Germany and France, imported more than they ex-
ported. This, too, was only natural. These trade balances 
merely reflected the financial positions of the respective coun-
tries. 
A mature debtor country must export more than it imports 
to balance its international payments. Germany, India, 
1A mature creditor nation 111 1111ld to exist when new loan11 to for-
eigners do not cover Interest and amortization due It on previous In· 
vestments abroad1 and a mature debtor nation exists when funds bor-
rowed currently xrom other countries are not as large as Interest and 
sinking fund payments due other countries on all previous foreign loans. 
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Argentina and Mexico are in this position at the present time. 
Similarly, a mature creditor country is obliged to import more 
than it exports. The-united Kingdom, France and the Nether-
lands are examples of such countries. 
RELATION OF PROSPERITY TO TRADE BALANCES 
It is a common belief that a country gains from internation-
al trade only when it sells more than it buys. There is no ade-
quate foundation for this belief. In fact, it is contrary to one 
of the basic principles underlying all trade among countries. 
In the last analysis, imports pay for exports. They are a. na-
tion's receipts for the commodities that it sells to foreigners. 
To refuse to accept imports is to refuse payments for goods 
sold a.nd awaiting to be sold. 
The trade balance in itself is therefore not a key to the 
prosperity of a country. For instance, the prosperity of the 
United States during the years preceding the war is no more 
to be attributed to the excess of exports that characterized 
our trade balance, than is the British prosperity of the same 
period to be accounted for on the grounds of an excess of im-
ports. . The economic well-being of a nation depends upon 
other considerations, principally on the effectiveness of its 
workers, the state of the arts, and the abundance of natural 
resources. · 
From a national viewpoint .large exports and small imports 
are in themselves neither desirable nor undesirable. Foreign 
trade is closely related to the international flow and ebb of 
capital. A trade balance reflects the debtor or creditor posi-
tion of a country and not the prosperity of the people~ Al-
though the time has come when the United States must change 
from an exporting to an importing country, thi.q transition 
should occasion no alarm. 
INCOMING AND OUTGOING PAYMENTS OF UNCLE SAM 
The World War and events since then changed the United 
State from the world's greatest debtor to that of the second 
·greatest creditor. Today we are a creditor nation to the amaz-
ing sum of about 20 billion dollars. Since 1928 new foreign 
loans have not been as large as interest and sinking fund 
payments due Americans on previous investments abroad. 
Hence the United States is now a mature creditor nation. 
Some of the effects of the sudden change in our inter-
national financial position since 1914, on our foreign trade 
and balance of payments, are discussed in Circular 146 (No. 
VIII of this series), "How Tariffs Affect Farm Prices." The 
more important facts of that study are summarized in table I. 
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The post-war international accounts of the United States 
show three important classe's of transactions that ,gave rise to 
net incoming payments, namely, (1) excess of exports over· 
imports, (2) earnings on investments abroad, and (3) returns 
on war debt. Both the second and third of these items are of 
recent development. In fact, they arose chiefly out of the 
consequences of the 'var. The inter-governmental war debt 
involves both a budgetary problem and a transfer problem.• 
It is, of. course,. subject to governmental action and in all 
probability will be further reduced. Earnings on investments, 
however, are payments on private transactions, fixed by con-
tract, and not easily adjusted to meet changed conditions. 
They are a large item in the incoming payments to the United 
States, totaling upwards of $800,000,000 in recent years. These 
are likely to increase in importance. 
On the other side of the account, it was shown that for-
eigners obtained American dollars to meet the above obliga-
tions by: (1) borrowing money from us, (2) using funds 
American tourists spent for services abroad, and (3) availing 
themselves of the gifts our immigrants sent to their relatives 
in the old country. Until recently, tourist expenditures and 
immigrant remittances were as la"rge as the sums paid to us 
as earnings on investments abroad and returns on the war 
debt. The excess of our exports over imports was about 
equivalent to new investments of Americans abroad. They 
borrowed and we exported. lieamvhile, the payments due 
American citizens for interest and sinking funds constantly 
increased. The depression has definitely stopped all new fo;-
eign loans and there is little likelihood that much money will 
be invested abroad in the nc.."d few years. 
Two alternatives were stressed in "How Tariffs Affect Farm 
Prices." These were: (1) shrinking the export industries, 
including mid-western agriculture, to more nearly a domestic 
basis thus cutting down exports, or (2) scaling down our tariff 
walls so as to permit enough imports, which would probably 
be chiefly diversified manufactures, to make it possible for 
farmers and manufacturers to sell a part of their produce in 
foreign markets. 
Whether it is better national policy to shrink the export 
group or allow more merchandise to be imported depends 
principally upon the advantages or disadvantages of tariff pro-
tection. Before examining the arguments' commonly ad-
vanced for tariffs, .however, it will be necessary to consider 
how foreign trade adjusts itself to tariff barriers. when, for 
instance, other countries are obligated to make large dollar-
payments to the United States. 
"The problem of traneferrlng English pounds Into American dollars Is 
quite technical In character. An outline of the steps Involved ls glve11 
In the section dealing with "Depreciated Currency," 
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ADJUSTMENTS NOW TAKING PLACE IN OUR BALANCE 
OF PAYMENTS 
Even though the United States does not change its tariff 
policy are there not some well defined long time adjustments 
in process that will eventually correct the acute scarcity of 
American dollars abroad f After all are not the painful rup-
tures ·in our foreigtt trade healing themselves t Let us con-
sider some of the forces that are at work which if left alone 
should in time relieve the pressure, on incoming payments-
trends that give promise to correct the vicious state of affairs 
now existing in our balance of payments. · 
· It is easier to see ho\V these adjustments take place when 
one studies the case of the foreign country meeting the pres-
sure of outward payments to the United States. Keep iit 
mind that we are protected by a high tariff wall. 
Briefly, many foreign countries each year must make im-
mense payments to us. These payments must be made in dol-
lars. Up until 1930, in most of these countries no apparent 
.scarcity of dollars developed. There bad been a rapid in-
crease in foreign loans obtained from us which made dollar 
exchange plentiful. · When foreign loans stopped, as they did 
during 1930, pressure soon developed. 
PREMIUM ON GOLD 
Foreign countries must continue to make large payments to 
the United States. To obtain American dollars, now that 
credit is no longer available, they must sell their goods to us. 
At present we stand ready to receive gold and certain raw 
materials without the penalty of a tariff. 1Iost manufactured 
articles are allowed to enter only after paying a heavy cus-
toms duty. 
Gold, moreover, has special privileges. Not only is it per-
mitted free entrance but it is acceptable in unlimited amounts 
and at a fixed price. All other duty.free articles if imported 
in excess of usual requirements are acceptable only at a much 
reduced price. This places gold in a favored position. As 
a result, in all countries making heavy payments to the United 
States there arises a premium on gold. 
Under normal conditions premiums on gold of this nature 
are the very forces t~at correct the pressures that may de-
velop in the international balance of payments. Since the 
monetary structures of these countries are based on gold a 
premium on it tends to press internal prices down. Their price 
levels in terms of gold .would therefore separate downward 
from ours. 
Since the outnow of gold from a country reduces the price 
level and the infiow raises it, the movement of gold to the 
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United States to discharge foreign obligations should set forces 
into· operation that would relieve the scarcity of dollars 
abroad. In barest outlines the process is as follows. Gold 
imports would inflate our price structure. The loss of gold 
by the outside world would deflate their price structures. 
Thus our prices would separate from those of other countries. 
This would act as a check on our exports and as a.stimUJ.ant 
to imports. Foreign goods would come in over the tariff wall 
in large enough amounts to reestablish a balance between out-
going and incoming payments. 
But why did this corrective not take place during the last 
decade t Certainly, all of the countries that made heavy pay-
ments to us have experienced a scarcity of gold. Further-
more, gold has flowed in extraordinary amounts into the 
United States.• 
Sterilized Gold 
In the :first place much of the gold that was sent to us was 
absorbed by the Federal Reserve Banks. The system acted 
partly as a sponge soaking up the incoming metal. Conse-
quently it did not lead to a proportional enlargement of the 
credit structure. Hence prices did not rise to the full extent 
that available gold stocks would have allowed.• The policy 
of the Federal Reserve Banks in not letting domestic prices 
inflate more than they did prior to 1929 may. have been com-
mendable. But whereas a stable price level was a good na-
tional objective, it threw an undue strain upon the price 
structure of the rest of the world. By attempting to keep 
domestic prices in hand, that is, avoiding undue inflation 
prior to 1929, the Federal Reserve Banks counteracted the ef-
fects of much of the incoming gold. Thus they lessened the 
curative powers of the incoming gold in reestablishing a nor-
mal balance in our. international payments. 
Tariff Warfare 
In the· second place, we followed a policy of trade restric-
. •The Unlted States, wblch In 1913 held only 23 percent of the gold in 
the world ln 1931 bad 43 percent of the total supply. England and 
Germany 'bad 10 percent and 11 percent respectively of the world'& 
gold ln 1913; by 1931 thelr share had fallen to slightly less than 7 
and 3 percent. During this period France had Increased her holdlnl.l'B 
from 16 to 19 percent, whlle Russia's share had dropped from 11 to 3 
percent. Two countries ln 1931 had come to poaae&11 over 60 percent of 
total gold stocks. On the other band, two great trading and financial 
countrlea--England and Germany-were forced to 011erate on leas than 
halt of their former gold reserves. Rogers, James Harvey. "Amerllllll 
\Velgha Her Gold." p. 211. Yale University Preas. 1931. 
•observe the following figures. Roughly the Federal Reserve Banks 
are required by Jaw to keep a "reserve ratio" of 40 percent. At the 
end of 1920 they had 43 percent: 1921, 70 percent; 1922, 73 percent; 
1923, 76 percent: 1924, 73 percent; 1926, 69 percent: 1926, 71 percent: 
1927, 66 percent: 1928, 63 percent: 1929£ 70 percent: 1930, 74 percent: 
1931, 67 percent; 1932, 63 percent. Sta lallcal Abstract of the Unltea 
States 1931 and Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 1933. 
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tion. Whenever a stream of goods showed signs of coming 
in over our tariff wall we quickly raised additional barriers. 
The Tariff Act of 1922 practically closed the American market 
to foreign goods, except for certain raw materials. The Tariff 
Act of 1930 followed with its all but prohibitive duties. To 
the· extent that the loss of gold abroad lowered their price 
levels it should have aided foreign manufacturers in selling in 
our market. But relief in this direction proved impossible. 
Any separation of our price level from that of other countries 
was more than otiset by new and higher taritis. 
Thus the rupture in onr balance of international payments 
has not been mended. The healing process that might and 
should have taken place through increased merchandise im-
ports was purposefully frustrated. Two things have happened 
chiefly as a result of our foreign trade policy: (1) It has 
snapped the bond that in the past tied the various price struc-
tures of the world together. Nearly all of the rest of the 
world has been forced to abandon the gold standard.' . Pre-
miums on gold became too high for them to support. (2) It 
has brought about widespread restrictions on trade, some of 
which have been retaliatory and some defensive in character. 
Many countries have been forced to use taritis ·to protect the 
stability of their currency. Nationalism, too, has played an 
important part. Consequently, innumerable trade barriers 
have been raised against our commodity exports. Such is the 
empasse in which we find international trade at present. 
Although inflowing gold was in part sterilized and merchan-
dises were not accepted without a heavy tariil penalty, other 
important corrective influences appear to be at work. Given 
time they promise to relieve, in some measure, the acute scarc-
ity of American dollars abroad. The more important ones are: 
1. Migration of American industries to foreign countries. 
2. An abrupt downward separation in terms of gold of the 
internal prices of other countries and ours due to depreciating 
currencies abroad. 
3. The probability of tourist travel, an invisible import, in-
.creasing. 
4. Foreign tariffs, import quotas, milling restrictions, and 
exchange controls which forcefully reduce our commodity ex-
ports. Each of these will be briefly examined. 
MIGRATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
The American manufacturer who is dependent upon foreign 
outlets has one escape. If the goods that he makes cannot be 
'For the time being, the United States, too, has departed from the gold 
1tandard. One cannot fore1ee, now, what measures the United States 
Government wlll adopt upon monetary policy. 
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sold abroad because of tariff barriers and the unavailability of 
American dollars in foreign countries, he can export his factory. 
Many of the moat aggressive and effi.ciently managed industries 
have done exactly this; they have established factories abroad. 
Observe two characteristics of this migration of our industries 
to other countries: (1) The industries opening plants abroad are 
among the leaders in paying high wages, in using efficient meth-
ods of production and in having outstanding managerial per-
sonnel; (2) while this escape is open to the resourceful business-
man, it is not open to the farmer. Obviously, it is impossible 
for Iowa farmers to establish branch farms in Germany and 
England to produce the lard that they formerly sold to those 
countries. 
The Department of Commerce estimates that there were 524 
American manufacturing establishments in Canada at the end 
of 1929 compared with 186 in 1918. Of the 453 American plants 
reported in Europe for 1929, only 82 were established before 
1918. No branch factories were established in South America 
before 1920. Nine years later Latin America had 49 American 
'branch factories and a total of 153 manufacturing plants. Our 
manufacturers had also established 64 plants in Africa and Asia 
and 42 in Australia and New Zealand. It is estimated that the 
total number of American plants abroad at present is over 2,000 
and that they employ between 400,000 and 500,000 workers. By 
exporting the factory the need for exporting manufactured goods 
is decreased. Thus the demand for American dollars required 
to make paym~nts to the United States is being lessened in for-
eign countries. 
Tariifs are not the only factor that has motivated American 
industries to migrate. Those who invest in oil, mining and 
agricultural uctivities abroad are only taking advantage of pro-
ductive natural resources. American-owned l\lexican oil wells, 
Cuban sugar plantations and Canadian pulp and newsprint fac-
tories are of this nature. Costs of transportation, patent serv-
ices and national sentiment have induced some to migrate. But 
it is safe to say that the ever growing tariff walls have unques-
tionably been the most influential factor.8 · 
Our Tariff Act of 1930 went into effect in June; by September 
the Canadians had raised their tariffs. Observe what has hap-
pened as a result. During the period from September, 1930, 
to June, 1931, 74 additional American branch manufacturing 
companies were established in Canada; nor has the movement 
stopped. Canada has preferential tariffs with 29 countries un-
... • • • the tarltf 111 In the maJorlty of cases the ftrst obstacle that 
the American exporter le likely to consider In connection with his ex-
port trade plans. It 111 safe to state that In the case of Canada, where 
probably the greatest mxnber of American branch plants are located. 
the tarllt le the most Influential factor ••• .'' Senate Document, No. 268. 
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Fig. 1. The movement of American lnduatrlu to foreign countries (ba&ed on A.merJeaa Dlttd ln•eatmeats la Fon.I.en coantrle11o Trade In~ 
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lnveatmenta made &Ince 1:130 are bued upon data given In Trade In-
formation Bulletins No. '161 and No. 803). 
der the British flag and ·favorable trade agreements with 43 
others. These markets are, therefore, open to the American 
branch factories that move to Canada. But the payrolls also 
have been transferred across the line; Canada undoubtedly has 
profited thereby. . 
It is of special interest to note what induslries are leaving the 
United States. At the end of 1929 the manufacturers of agri-
cultural and industrial machinery had 147 such plants; phar-
maceutical products, 102; . electric and tel~phone supplies, 98; 
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automotive industry, 87; paints and varnishes, 32; and so on 
down the line. The articles, according to the Department of 
Commerce, range from typewriters to mining machinery and 
from cough drops to automobiles. As is shown below these in-
dustries have been among the most effective in using American 
labor. This group ha.s been directly responsible for forcing up 
our wage scale. Because they were among the most efficient they 
were able to pay high wages and at the same time sell cheaply 
enough to attract foreign buyers. But, at present, in order to 
maintain these foreign outlets, they find it necessary to export· 
their factories. 
DEPRECIATED CURRENCY 
Outside of France and the United States, practically the whole 
world has departed from gold.' Because gold increased in value 
relative to all other commodities, it came to command too high 
a premium. As a result country after country found it impos-
sible to pay the price necessary to stay on gold. The immediate 
causes for abandoning the gold standard are both numerous and 
complex. They are different for each country. But since they 
are not germane to our analysis, they may be omitted. The ques-
tion arises: What determines the value of the money of those 
countries no longer redeemable in gold T The answer is simple. 
Take the English pound. Since its price is no longer fixed in 
terms of gold, the free play of supply and demand forces. now 
determine its market value. The thing that happened to sterling . 
was similar to what took place in wheat during and after the 
operations of the Farm Board. The Farm ~oard had fixed the 
domestic price of wheat and stood ready to buy or sell any 
amount at a fixed price. World economic events soon showed 
that the Farm Board's wheat price was too high. ·When it 
abandoned wheat the price of wheat quickly found a new level, 
determined principally by supply and demand forces. As in 
wheat, the foreign exchange markets at present establish the 
price of currencies no longer based on gold. Let us briefly 
examine the supply and demand factors, for instance, of British 
sterling. 
On the supply side of sterling are British importers and all 
other persons who want to part with sterling in order to get 
foreign currencies. This includes the British government and 
citizens who have borrowed American funds and who want dol-
lars to pay interest and sinking funds. On the demand side 
are all buyers of B1;itish exports and all other people who want 
'The United States la at present technically orr the International gold 
standard. The reasons for this action on the Part of the Federal Gov-
ernment have not been external but chiefly Internal. The collapse of 
the banking structure within the United States rather than the pressure 
of outward payments of doJJars to foreign countries haa been respon-
sible for the suspension of gold oa:vmenta. 
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to exchange foreign currency for sterling. The market for Brit-
ish money today is like the market for wheat and corn. The 
price from day to day is no longer fixed but it fluctuates accord-
ing to the dictates of supply and demand. What is tme of ster-
ling applies to every inconvertible currency. 
Note now what happens. Since there is a pressure on o~tward 
payments in these countries, they are anxious to exchange their 
currency for dollars. But dollars are scarce. So they are 
obliged to bid up the price of dollars, that is, they must ofter 
more of their money to induce those persons who have dollars 
to sell. Thus their currency depreciates relative to dollars. But 
this action corrects the balance of payments. It does this in two 
\Vays: (1) by checking the consumption of those goods 
that are imported, and (2). by stimulating exports. 
A book pl,lblished in England, listed at 1 pound sterling, 
cost us $4.86 before England abandoned gold; it can now be 
bought for $3.40. American dollars in this way buy more Brit-
ish goods than formerly and we would, therefore, expect more 
of their goods to come in over our tariff wall. Contrary to 
popular belief, however, this has not happened. Although Great 
Britain has increased her share of the world's export trade since 
September, 1931, our commodity ill'l.ports from countries off the 
gold standard have not increased relative to our total imports. 
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NonraY------- Krone ,., .1'138 • Spain----·.._ ______ Pe.eta .JmO ,CJ820 4! 
Swed------- Krone .:lllSO .uae • 81flberland..--------- Fnmc .)9111> ,1915 100 
Amertca: I 
Canad----..- DoUar J.0000 I .B!ill • ArgentlnL-------- snver PdO ,llGQ ' .li8tl6 81 BrulL---------~ llnreta ,UlllJ i .11183 
" 
l(p:Jeo __________ _. snver PdO .G85 .1181) Gf 
.Alla: j Japan. ________ Tm .«& 
1. 
.!1U 4! 
India.------ Rupee .IGriO .!SS 'ID 




•:Foreign exebaap rertrleted by JecaD1 establllbed eoatrol or enb&DP, therefore 
on tbe sold 1tand1nl only teclmfeSlly. . • 
•Foreign exebaaae coatTolled uaofJlctanr. 
Source: "liloatbl,. Rtttew of Credit and Bualaen OondlUoas ll«oad Ffdfl'lll Re8ene 
District." Federal BeterTe Bank, New York, Frb. 1, 111133. 
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The chief reason why depreciated currencies have not had any 
noticeable influence upon our imports appears to be the fact that 
most of our tariffs are specific duties or a combination of specific 
and ad valorem with customs collected on the basis of the one 
that proves to be the higher of the two. When prices decline a 
specific duty increases relative to the value of the commodity. 
Take ·sugar for an illustration. When raw sugar sold for 4 
cents a pound at the point of importation, the duty of 2 cents 
a pound was 50 percent of the price of the raw sugar. But with 
Cuban sugar selling at 1.3 cents a pound at New York, as it did 
during 1931, the tariff penalty became 150 percent of the import 
price. This increase in tariffs relative to the value of the article 
imported, when the duty is specific in nature, due to the sharp 
reduction in commodity prices, has tended to offset the influence 
of depreciated currencies. · 
Let us also consider how, for example, depreciated sterling 
tends to check the consumption of those goods that England 
imports. An American automobile quoted at $730 formerly cost 
the Englishman 150 pounds sterling; today, assuming that the 
automobile is still selling for $730, it takes 215 of the English-
man's pounds to buy the automobile. Wages, salaries and other 
forms of income in England· have not changed materially, hence 
it is now harder for the Englishman to buy goods that are im-
ported. This, of course, does not hold for imports coming from 
countries that also have had their currencies decline in value. 
The Danish krone is quoted at 58 percent of its par exchange 
value, while the pound is selling for 70 percent of its former 
gold value. Accordingly, English consumers are not checked in 
buying Danish goods, instead it is slightly to their advantage 
to use commodities produced in Denmark. In all of the preced-
ing analyses it has been assumed that internal prices-wages, 
salaries, ta.'Ces, contractual obligations involving capital invest-
ments and those commodities produced and consumed within the 
country-are more or less rigid in character. 
TRAVEL ABROAD 
The downward separation of many foreign price levels away 
from our own may be expected, in normal times, to encourage 
Americans to travel abroad. Although the depression has sliarp-
ly reduced tourist travel, it would seem that the cheaper costs 
in Europe .and elsewhere are likely to act as a strong inducement 
for Americans to spend, when incomes again permit, their vaca-
tions abroad. As .living costs become progressively cheaper in 
foreign countries, foreign travel may be expected to become in-
creasingly popular. Services .and goods bought by our tourists 
have the same influence as imports of merchandise; in fact, they 
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are .considered an invisible import. They help.to correct our 
balance of payments. Tourist expenditures are already an im-
portant source of dollars to Europeans. "Thus, in true lordly 
fashion, may we eat and drink at the tables of our .debtors 
much of what our system of trade restrictions make impossible 
for us to receive in more direct ways.'" 
TRADE BARRIERS ABROAD 
It is not necessary to stress th!;! adverse effects of the. lll!lDY 
forms of trade restrictions enactea by those countries that here-
tofore have been our best customers. There are all manner of 
tariffs, quotas and milling restrictions. The most drastic has 
been the control of foreign exchanges. Viewed from the stand-
point of the countries required to make heavy outward payments, 
import restrictions are for them rational- correctives. In large 
measure, they have been forced to use them in self-defense. 
Because of"the demand for outward payments, they must export 
more than they import. To accomplish this they have curtailed 
imports, the one factor within their control 
One example will suffice. Take Cuba, heavily in debt to us, a 
producer of one crop, sugar. Americans are among the heaviest 
consumers of sugar in the world; the Cubans normally use more 
lard per capita than any other people. We need their sugar 
and they want our lard. But what has happened T 
Sugar is selling for less than 1 cent a pound in Cuba. Our 
tariff is 2 cent.s a pound. The Cuban government has retaliated 
by increasing the duty on lard to 71h cent.s a pound, and as a 
result the selling price of lard in Cuba is three times the Chicago 
price. Observe the results. Cuba, which in the past has been 
our third largest consumer of lard, exceeded only by Great 
Britain and Germany, bas reduced her lard purchases to less 
than one-third of normal. Cuba, which usually took around 80 
million pounds, in 1932 bought from us only about 25 million 
pounds of lard. 
Adjustments of this kind, although they tend to correct our 
balance of payments, that is, they bring the supply and demand 
of dollars in the out.side world into an equilibrium, chiefly by 
decreasing our exports, fall, of course, heavily upon the Ameri-
can exporter, who is the most efficient of all domestic producers. 
The correctives now taking place bear with ruthless severity, 
upon those industries, agricultural and non-agricultural, that 
are dependent upon foreign outlets. As all of the preceding 
study shows, at present, knowingly or otherwise, the United 
States is carrying out a policy the consequences of which can 
be none other than to decrease exports. 
"Rogers, Jamee Harvey. America Weighs Her Gold. p. 1&&. 
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SOME CONSEQUENCES OF LOWERING TARIFFS 
In the preceding analysis we noted that the burden of the 
adjustments now taking place in our balance of payments fall 
chiefly upon the American producer dependent upon foreign 
outlets. The movement of exporting American factories, the 
effects of depreciated currencies and the influence of trade bar-
riers abroad all bear adversely on the exporter. Since downward· 
tariff adjustments are the principal alternative, the remainder 
of this study is devoted to an examination of the consequences 
that probably would arise from a scaling down of tariffs. 
Tariffs, as was indicated at the close of Circular 146 (No. 
VIII of this series), are intended to check imports. It is the 
protective aspect and not the· revenue-raising feature of tariffs 
that is commonly stressed in Congress. What reasons are there 
for a nation to check, in fact, often prohibit, imports 7 Is it 
better national policy gradually to reduce the tariff protection 
which is at present supporting certain industries and thus in-
crease imports, or let the correctives now taking place contract 
the export industries to somewhat more nearly a domestic pro-
duction basis t 
THE CASE FOR TARIFFS EXAMINED 
Many arguments are advanced in favor of tariffs. The more 
important of these are as follows. Tariffs, it is claimed : 
1. Help maintain the standard of living of a high-wage coun-
try against the competition of a low-wage country. 
2. Provide a home market for the American farmers. 
3. Protect labor and if used in an emergency reduce unem-
ployment. 
4. Protect the domestic producer against foreign dumping. 
5. Aid in building up industries that are necessary for the 
national defense of a country. 
6. Foster infant industry. 
7. May be employed to facilitate internal economic adjust-
ments. 
Each of these arguments will be examined in turn. Although 
space does not permit a full discussion of all aspects of the tariff 
question, an endeavor is made to show in broad outlines how 
tariffs apply under present conditions to this country. The 
treatment, of necessity, is in general terms. Yet an attempt is 
made to distinguish between tariffs as emergency measures and 
tariffs as part of a long-time policy. 
High Wages 
It is evident that many factories could not pay the wages 
that they are now paying if the tari1f on their products were 
sharply reduced. This fact leads many people to conclude that 
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our high wages are to be attributed to tariffs. Stated in another 
way, they believe that inasmuch as the American scale of v:ages 
is higher than in foreign countries, cheap foreign goods must 
be kept out or else under competition wages will be forced down. 
To what extent is this assumption valid for our wage scale as a 
whole! 
It is commonly recognized that the. automobile industry has 
been one of the leaders in ·bringing about higher wages. But 
automobiles are not tariff-protected; they are exported. Our 
motor industry has captured markets the world over in direct 
competition with automobiles made with much cheaper labor 
in France, England and Germany. The explanation is simple. 
The American worker is more effective than the European. The 
reasons are several. Mass production, specialization of labor, 
superior managerial personnel and an abundance of resources 
all play a part. Take, for example, the experience of American 
branch factories abroad, many of which find the efficiency of 
European workers lower than that of the American. "An 
American automobile plant assembles a certain model in about 
34 hours. • • • Its European subsidiary assembles the same model 
in 60 hours. • • • "' 
Take· an illustration in agriculture. The rice farmers of 
Louisiana, Arkansas and especially of Texas until recently were 
among the most prosperous in the entire South. They, too, are 
on an export basis. Their rice is sold to Europe, Canada, Latin 
America and even to the Orient. The chief exporting countries 
are India, Siam and Indo-China. At first thought it would seem 
impossible for us to compete with these countries for world mar-
kets in view of their unlimited supply of cheap labor and low 
standards of living. But, again, the explanation is not difficult. 
The average rice farmer in Texas harvests 10,000 bushels a year. 
He uses the most modem large scale machinery." The Chinese 
farmer depends at best upon a water buffalo, a cmde plow, a 
hoe, a sickle and a flail. BucJtl' found that it takes a Chinese 
pParker, Graham W. "American Branch Planta In Europe," Factory 
and Industrial Management. October, 1932. 
wit Is of Interest to note that Prof. Seaman A. Knapp who 1ett Iowa. 
State College In 1886 to develop the rice Industry of lower Loulslllna was 
the principal plonecir In bringing about the remarkable technical ad· 
vancements which domestic rice growing has undergone. He Intro-
duced modem machine methods, thus revolutlonlslng rice production. He 
Induced farmers from the north central states. especially from Iowa. 
who were familiar yrlth large-scale machlnel'J', to come to southwestern 
Louisiana and take up rice growln.-. These farmers lost no time In 
turning to machinery. As a result, whereas we formerly Imported 
up to 6,000,000 bushels of rice a year over a. tartrr wall of 11,( cents a. 
119und. we now export as much as !6,000,000 bushels annuillty. See 
Howard W. Odum, "'South em Pioneers." for an account of the Important 
role played by Seaman A.. Knapp, The University of North Carolina 
PreH, pp. 89·116. 1926. 
llBuck. John Loaslng. "China's Farm Economy." University of Chicago 
Press. 1930. 
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farmer 945 man-hours to produce an acre of rice. Compare this 
with the 20 to 30 hours of man-labor that the American spends 
per acre. In reality, it will become increasingly difficult for the 
Chinese to hold his home market in the face of our low cost of 
production. 
There is no doubt that wages are higher in the United States 
than in Europe. This is true not only for money wages but also 
for what wages buy, namely, real wages. This means that the 
American worker can buy more food, shelter and clothing for 
a day's work than can Europeans. 
It is clear, however, that higher real wages cannot be handed 
over to workmen by the employers unless the workmen turn out 
a larger volume of products. If all Americans gainfully em-
ployed were no more effective in production than Europeans, 
wages could be no higher in the United States than in Europe. 
All of the income of a country has its origin in the output of 
its industries, agricultural and non-agricultural. High wages 
cannot be paid unless the chief industries of a country are highly 
productive. 
The high real wages, hence the high standard of living, of 
the United States rest fundamentally upon the greater produc-
tivity of the American farmer and worker. 
Unprotected Industries 
But not all industries are equally effective in converting work 
into articles that people want. The rice farmers and the work-
ers in the automobile industry are especially so. Labor is most 
productive in those industries that can sell cheaply enough to 
capture foreign markets and it is least productive in those fields 
that require prohibitive tariffs in order to operate. For example, 
labor used in producing wheat in Kansas with combines, tractors 
and other large-scale machinery is e.'ttremely effective, while 
labor used in growing sugar beets, at present, is comparatively 
ineffective. One is suited to the economy of the United States 
while the other apparently is not. The Kansas farmer who pays 
high American wages sells his wheat at world prices. He was, 
until recently, when policies beyond his control closed his for-
eign markets, producing at a profit. On the other hand, the 
sugar beet grower using cheap foreign labor, usually Mexican, 
has needed a high tariff so as to enable him to operate at all. 
Should the sugar beet industry be able to mechanize and thereby 
increase its labor productivity several fold, it, too, may become 
effective, be able to employ American workers, and hence be-
come adapted to our economy. · 
The general effectiveness of the workers in the dominant in-
dustries of a country tend to establish the general wage scale. 
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In agriculture the tempo is· set by such farmers as the hog, 
wheat, cotton, apple, orange and rice growers and in manufac-
turing by the automobile, tire and the machine-making indus-
tries. The fact that products such as lard, wheat and cotton; 
copper, tin plate and lumber; locomotives, cash registers, sew-
ing machines, typewriters and printing machinery; tires, cig-
arettes and hosiery; and automobiles-all products of highly 
paid labor-are exported and are sold cheaply is proof that 
Americans have in them a comparative advantage.0 
There is a large class of industries that for sundry reasons 
do not come within the range of international trade. Bulk:Y 
products like brick, tile and cement are necessarily made near 
the spot where they are used. Hay and coarse feed grains fall 
into this class. Then, too, perishable commodities like vegetables 
and milk are usually produced near their market. Houses, office 
buildings, manufacturing plants and roads are all made by 
domestic labor. Workers in these and similar occupations may 
or may not be more effective than foreign labor. It is estimated 
that of the 48,833,000 gainfully employed workers reported in 
the 1930 census about three-fourths were employed in unpro-
tected industries. Not all of the remaining one-fourth of the 
workers benefit from the tariff. Many tariffs are clearly nomi-
nal. For example, most of the duties on agricultural commodi-
ties-to mention only a. few, take barley, oats, corn, apples and 
potatoes-are practically meaningless. The same is true of 
many tariffs on manufactured articles. Most American workers 
and farmers are engaged in unprotected enterprises. 
Protected Industriu 
Finally, there is another class of industries unable to produce 
unless they have the support of a tariff. Certain wool, cotton 
and silk textiles, fine lace, fancy embroidery, toys, dyestuffs 
and many other chemicals, artistic pottery, silverware, fancy 
leather goods, tin plate, steel rails and sugar-these are some of 
the articles in this group. After years of protection they arc 
often no more in a position to meet foreign competition than 
when the protection was first given. Imports would quickly en-
ter should tariffs be removed even though there is no obvious 
obstacle to their domestic production from the viewpoint of 
soil, climate, skill and of the organization ability required. It is 
this group that finds high wages an insuperable barrier. They 
do not measure up to the average productivity set by the domi-
nant industries. While such industries may appear to be suited 
to a country, they do not have the comparative advantage. Their 
difficulty often is not physical but economic. They cannot hold 
their own against the most effective and dominant industries. 
DThe Jaw of comparaUve advantage, the first principle underlying 
all International trade, 111 explained In considerable detail In Circular 
HG (No. Vfll Of thl11 serle11), "How Tarl1T11 AITect Farm Prices," pp. H0·43, 
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High wages are more characteristic of the unprotected than 
of the industries that are supported by tariffs. Observe the fol-
lowing table. 
TABLE m. AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS OF ALL WAGE·EARNERS IN 21 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES A1''D THE APPROXIMATE TARIF1!' 
PROTECTION THESE INDUSTRIES RECEIVE 
Olaas of 
~ manufacturing lnduatry, 
= 
1 Printing, news and 
mair!Wne ---------
2 Iron and steel --------
a Printing, book and Job 
' Automobile -------
6 Agricultural Implement -
II Foundries and machine 
shops ----------· 7 Rubber manufacturlnir. 
IJ Paint and vam19b ••• ---
9 ObemJcal 
10 Electrical manufacturlnir 
11 Paper and pulp_ _____ _ 
12 Furniture -·····-·····-
13 Meat packing --------
14 Lamber ·-·-······---
16 Paper products ··--··· 
16 Leather tanning and 
l!nl!hlDlr ---· ···---· 
17 SllJc manufacturing --· 
18 Wool m11nufacturln1r ---
10 Boot and shoe. __ ---···· 
20 Hosiery and knlt goods 
21 Cotton manufacturing'. 
Wairee Relation 
per of 
week.• tariff to 
1025· 1929 value of 















nil A domestic Industry, practJeaUy nn· 
protected by tariffs. 
40 Monopoly prices are made possible In 
tin plate and In steel rails beeause of 
tariffs. Industry also protected In 
Pllr Iron at and near seaboard.• 
nil to 20 Chiefly a domestic Industry not l!IIP• 
ported by tar! ffa. 
nil to 10 Strictly on an export buls, unpro· 
tected. 
nil No tariff•, hence unprotected.· 
n11 On export basis, unprotected. 
nil to25 Rubber tires, footwear, gloves, caps, 
and numerous similar articles are ex-
ported. A few apeclaltles are pro-
tected. 
nD to 25 Induatry on an export basla In nearly 
all plgmenta, palntl and varnishes. 
Protected only In some apec:laltles. 
80 Highly Protected In most products. 
Some like sodium compounds on ex-
. port baall. . 
nn to 85 HeaVY exportem of eleetrfeal maehln-
ery and appararu. Llirht bulbs pro-
tected. 
10 to 25 Lal'EO Imports of paper base atocl: .. 
SS Imported and exported. Not enough 
Information to determine extent of 
protection. 
nD A domeatlc Industry, chiefly unpro· 
tectecl .. 
16 Both exported and Imported. Pro· 
tected In IODle Woodl. 






Protected by tariffs chiefly In those 
leather goods ll!QUlrlng considerable 
band work. Leather footwear, belt· 
Ing, bamesa and suitcases are ex-
ported. 
Fancy broad 11Dk hlirhlJ' protected. 
Onl.lnary broad aDk leas dependent 
upon tariff aupport. Foll fashion silk 
hoBfery are exported In quantity.' 
DeftnltelJ' dependent upon tariff pro-
tection. Induatry In a 1>0slt1on of 
comparative dl!advantage.• 
Protection limited to tbo!e shoes and 
boots requiring mnch band work. 
Protected except for machine-made 
hosiery. 
Fine goods dependent upon tariff sup· 
· port. This part of fndnstry lne!fl'Ctlve 
compared With foreign cotton mills.• 
All lnduatrfes --------- !T .oo 
•"Wages In the United States, 1111'·1000." National Indnstrlal Oonfermee Board. 
New York.. lll81.. Based on repo~ of 1,•U manufacturing lndnatrfes emploYIDit about 
840,000 worken. 
•Estimates baaed upon the ad ,..Jomn equlnlent for tm.n u reported by the 
201 
Of the 21 manufacturing industries that are listed in table III, 
11 are always in the van when tariffs are being considered by 
Congress, while 10 of these are either indifferent or are actively 
opposed to tariffs. The average weekly wages for 1925-1929 of 
the employees on the payrolls of these plants were $27.69. They 
ranged from $39.03 for news and magazine publishing to $19.96 
for cotton manufacturing plants located in the northern states. 
~t is significant to observe that of the first 10 paying highest 
wages, 8 are unprotected industries. Only two protected indus-
tries-iron and steel and chemicals-held a place among the high 
\Vage industries. The monopoly position of iron and steel in 
certain important products made possible by tariffs is worthy 
of notice. At the bottom of the list, with wages below $23 a 
week, all but one have high tariff protection. Observe that al-
though they are given tariff support, they still are unable to pay 
as high wages as the more effective industries. 
It is true that tariffs make it possible for some factories to 
employ more workers than would otherwise be possible. But 
their effect is to lower rather than to increase real wages. Cus-
tom duties help certain domestic producers. They make it 
possible for those domestic enterprises in which labor and 
capital are relatively ineffective to take men and funds from 
those fields in which labor and capital are more effective. In 
substance they therefore subsidize the less .efficient producers 
of a country at the expense of the more ·capable, alert and 
efficient. 
Tariffs protect the textile industry against the high wages 
which the efficient motor industry is able to pay. They make 
it possible for sugar beet growers to hire workers in the 
same area where the more effective com and wheat farmers 
operate. Even so, up until now, the beet growers have been 
unable to pay high American wages. 
The high standard of living of the United States-abundance 
of wholesome food, modem homes, time for education, auto-
mobiles and so on-rests fundamentally upon the effectivent:ss 
of the workers in the dominant industries. The effectiveness 
of workers in the dominant industries, in turn, depends upon 
the following factors. The first of these is land, commonly 
thought of as our natural resource. Deep black soil, favor-
able climate, minerals and water power-these are aspects of 
u. s. Tuitt OommlafOll ID "Relation or DaUec to Value or Importl." lllal!. Serlel, 
um; ad Ill "Oompullon or Rata of Dul.let In the Tarin Act ol 1930 1114 Ill the Tutn 
Act or JD." 1ll80. 
eTaUlllC, P. w~ ''Some Aapecta or the Tarin Question." 3n1 enlarged edJUon 
eonttnued to 111111 with the eooperaUon of H. D. White, Hanrard trnlnnllJ' Pms, 
Oambrldce. Ob•P· xxm.. un. 
'Tauuts Op. ett. p.us. 
"'l'a11111s. 0p. ett. Chap. nvm. 
flncJudea onlJ' the norUiern eotton manufaeturllls p1anta, • In au. 
IT&UlllS. Op, elt. p. '81. 
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Fig. 2. A compa.rlson of the average weekly wages of workers In 
the prJnclpa.1 classes of manufacturing Industries with the approximate 
extent. of tarllt protection each class of manufacturing Industry re-
ceives. 
land, the final source of all materials and energy. The second 
includes the economic technique of a people. It is made up 
of the accumulated material equipment. Here are included 
tools, tractors, combines-all machines-railways and indus-
trial plants. Then there is the scientific knowledge and tech-
nical efficiency of the people. This final factor, perhaps the 
most important of all, also takes in the qualities of the work-
ers themselves. These involve the industry, thrift, stability 
and health of the workers. To these qualities must·be added 
the size of the population relative to natural resom:ces. With 
a favorable combination of all these factors no power on 




Henry Clay in his famous speech of 1824 declared that pro-
tective tariffs for manufacturers would benefit agriculture. 
He held that such tariffs would create a home market for farm 
products. Just what advantages the domestic market had 
over the foreign market were not set forth. In times such as 
the present it can readily be shown ihat the home market is 
the surer outlet. A foreign market is more likely to be closed 
by sudden changes in foreign tariffs and by war. The produc-
er who is on a domestic basis does not face these uncertainties. 
The present tariff crisis in international trade has brought 
widespread disaster to the hog,. cotton, wheat, tobacco and 
rice growers. The average farm price of these commodities 
is now only 43 percent of pre-war, whereas the prices of those 
farm commodities that are not produced in excess of domestic 
requirements stands at SO percent of their 1910-1!}14 level. 
Tariffs for the purpose of giving the farmer a home market 
involve giving protection to industry in order to bring about 
a working population in our cities large enough to consume 
all of the farm products grown in this country. Thus it is rea-
soned that if the manufactured goods which arc imported 
were made at home the additional number ·of people em-
ployed would consume most, if not all, of the 1.5 to 2 billioi:i. 
dollars of farm commodities normally exported. 
A policy of this kind in all probability cannot be success-
ful from the farmer's viewpoint for three reasons: (1) It is 
apparently impossible to expand our industrial population 
anywhere near enough to absorb all of the food and raw 
materials produced on our farms; (2) industrial tariffs al-
ways tend to increase the cost of living to farm people, hence 
are a direct burden on agriculture, and (3) the protected 
goods absorb, because of their higher price, a greater share 
of the consumer's income thus leaving him less with which 
to buy bread and meat. · 
Historically, the policy enunciated by Henry Clay more 
than a century ago has proved for American agriculture, 
especially for the l\lississippi Valley, a direct burden rather 
than an indirect benefit. 
The American farmer continues to be inescapably depend-
ent upon foreign buying. The home rr.arket is, in spite of 
of the phenomenal growth of our cities, too small to absorb 
the farmer's food and raw materials. Nor is there even 
a remote probability that our industrial population will fur-
nish during the next decade or two a home market suf-
ficiently large. The farmer must continue to export or face 
ruinously low prices that result from glutted domestic mar-
kets. The crop and animal products of nearly one-fifth of 
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our total crop land were exported from 1922 to 1928. Since 
then these exports have been piling up until we are con-
fronted with unprecedented carryovers. Under the existing 
price system, facts force us to accept the conclusion, wheth-
er we wish it or not, that farmers must continue to sell 
abroad or face wholesale liquidation. Temporarily, with gov-
ernmental aid, production may, of course, be checked or even 
curtailed to something approaching a domestic basis. But 
as a long-time policy, it is very problematical. 
Protection did hasten the industrialization of America but 
the home market for agriculture did not materialize. The 
prosperity or poverty of Apierican agriculture continues to 
depend chiefly upon world prices. · 
But protection did one thing frequently overlooked. It 
set certain forces into motion that have slowly and silently 
lowered the relative buying power of the commodities that 
the farmer sells. Not only have these forces practically closed 
his foreign markets but they have, in addition, increased the 
cost of many of the goods that he buys. Thus gradually 
there has occurred an ever widening discrepancy between the 
things the fa.rm.er sold and the articles he bought. 
We placed a high tariff on dyestuffs and textiles; This 
kept the German and English supplies out and enabled do-
mestic manufacturers to produce these goods. This gave rise 
to a working population which in turn furnished a demand 
for farm produce. Observe, however, what happened on the 
other side of the account. 
Prior to the enactment of these tariffs, imported dyestuffs 
and textiles gave rise to purchasing power abroad; hence, 
they provided payments for foodstuffs that were exported. 
By shutting out these commodities we, therefore, reduced 
our ability to export. At this point it would appear that the 
home market .that arose, at best, simply replaced the for-
eign -market that was lost. In fact, it can be shown that 
in this replacement of markets the total demand for farm 
produce was actually decreased. Society was made poorer. 
In the United States both dyestuffs and textilesu are manu-
factured at a greater cost than in Germany and England, 
and in Europe they are now growing wheat on sandy ancl 
infertile soil and producing pork and lard at cost much 
higher than in the Corn Belt. Equally important is the fact 
that the price of clothing made from domestically manu-
factured dyestuffs and textiles was raised to the farmer. 
Protection is always a double-edged sword cutting simultane-
ously in two directionc:. It raises the farmer's cost of living 
~o-;t"texutes can be manufactured more cheaply ab~oe.d than In the 
United States. Rayon nnd certain machine-made hosiery are notable 
exceptions. Observe the comments given In table Ill. 
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and it reduces his income. But usually it acts so slowly that 
the effects are not obvious until serious consequences have 
occurred. 
The use of tariffs as an emergency measure to put men to 
work is considered below. To employ tariffs to force con-
sumers to "Buy American" only shifts the burden of the 
depression even more upon the producers dependent upon 
foreign markets. Long before it is possible for dollars spent 
for American linens, assuming that a tariff has shut out Irish 
linens, to find their way to American workers in new fac-
tories or increased employment, the price of farm products 
will be further depressed. Foreign buyers quickly reduce 
their purchases of raw materials. Cables work faster than 
payrolls. Raw materials are more sensitive to changes in de-
mand than wages. To this must be added the likelihood of 
retaliation. It would simply be another battle in the inter-
·national warfare of tariffs with the producers of lard, cot-
ton and wheat in "no man's land." 
Unemployment 
It is said that tariffs are a factor in keeping work at home 
and thereby reducing unemployment. This argument has 
strong popular appeal. There is no doubt that a country can 
reduce the volume of its imports and thereby create employ-
ment at home. Goods that are not imported, if they are to 
be had at all, must be made domestically. This obviously is 
a demand for labor. 
But is the demand thus created a.n additional demand for 
labor! On the surface it may appear that there actually is 
more income. The same error is involved, however, that was 
pointed out in the home-market argument. 
Thus, if we kept out rubber boots that Czechoslovakia is 
able to lay down in our market at less cost than our own 
manufacturers, more American workers would be put to work 
making rubber boots. This action would throw out of work 
Czechoslovakian laborers who in turn would buy less wheat 
bread and meat. Potatoes and black bread is the diet to which 
they then are forced. As before, by excluding imports we 
reduce exports of equal value. By giving the rubber boot 
market to some domestic manufacturer we have deprived 
some domestic exporter, that is, some American farmer, of 
his lard and wheat market abroad. No additional employ-
ment is created. The farmer, one of our most efficient pro-
ducers, lost his job while the bootmaker, less suited to the 
economy of the United States, was given a job. 
No person would deny that a sudden downward adjustment 
of tariffs would throw many wage earners out of employ-
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ment. Once a country has embarked upon a protective policy 
it cannot by one stroke remove tariffs without causing serious 
dislocations. Labor and capital cannot shift readily. Like-
wise, it is equally true that if all imports were suddenly 
stopped-the aim of the "Buy American" sponsors-it would 
cause dislocations even more serious than those already ex-
isting within the export industries. 
J.M. Keynes, noted English economist, wrote in 1923, "The 
one thing than protection cannot do is to cure unemploy-
ment. If Protectionists merely mean that under their sys-
tem men will have to sweat and. labor more, I grant their 
case. By cutting off imports we might increase the aggre-
gate of work; but we should be diminishing the aggregate of 
wages .•.. Imports are receipts and exports are payments. 
How, as a nation, can we expect to better ourselves by dimin-
ishing our receipts T Is there anything that a tariff Muld 
do, which an earthquake could not do better T '' 
Dumping 
A tariff against dumping is nothing more than an attempt 
to enforce fair competition. It prevents short time cut-throat 
and unfair competition carried on to crush a competitor after 
which prices are raised to a higher level- than formerly. Al-
though tariffs are a clumsy device, until better remedies are 
available, it appears wise to use them to protect the import 
trade from the demoralizing practices of dumping. 
The principal forms of dumping may be described as 
sporadic dumping of occasional overstocks, predatory dump-
ing, monopoly dumping, and state-aided dumping. To these 
may be added "exchange dumping." Undue imports caused 
by depreciated currency come under this class. 
To deal with these by tariffs is far from simple and is ex-
posed to many risks. It is altogether too easy for an inef-
ficient, high cost, group of producers to convince their 
congressmen that they are facing dumping from abroad. 
Military Necessity 
No nation can afford to become wholly dependent upon 
foreign countries for its supply of war materials. But to 
carry on a modern war the list of essential materials is in-
deed long. Self-sufficiency, it is asserted by the most nation-
alistic, is therefore desirable. Defense, they declare, is more 
important than opulence. · 
Enough diversification of industry to prevent paralysis and 
to assure the necessities of life in time of war is undoubtedly 
desirable. The argument is not economic but wholly politi-
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cal. The price of tariffs to attain these ends should be clearly 
recognized as a cost of preparedness. They are a tax on 
the standard of living of a nation similar to any other tax 
the revenue of which is used to build battleships, bombs 
and machine guns. How much a country should pay for mili-
tary preparedness is chiefly a socio-political problem. It 
is seldom, if ever, considered on its economic merits. 
Infant Industries 
If a nation has infant industries that are suitable to the 
economy of the country they may very properly be accorded 
protection until they reach maturity. Children should be 
protected and cared for until they reach maturity before 
they are forced to compete with mature people. Economists 
have generally admitted that the analogy holds for infant in-
dustries. Many of the early tariffs of this country may be 
justified on the grounds that they encouraged and hastened 
the industrialization of America. 
Sight, however, should not be lost of the fact that most 
of our older industries can no longer, by any flight of imag-
ination, be classified as infants. There is a real basis for the 
fear that the usual relationship between parent and child 
are reversed and that by lobbying and logrolling the child 
today dictates his own tariff terms to the parental authority. 
Facilitate Economic Adjustments 
When new technique, the development of new resources 
in foreign couniries or improved transport facilities subject 
a domestic industry to sudden and violent disloc,ations, 
tariffs may be used to break the fall of prices and render the 
movement of capital and labor to other enterprises easier. 
For instance, the rapid exploitation of the American prairies 
following the Civil War flooded England with cheap wheat. 
The English farmer could not meet this competition and for 
fully a quarter of a century England experienced a severe 
agricultural depression. Since England was a wheat importing 
country a judicious application of protection would have ren-
dered the farmer's plight in England less seYere. In adjustments 
of this character tariffs may well be employed to mitigate 
disaster and alleviate distress. 
DESIRABILITY OF TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the burden of 
the adjustments now taking place in international trade falls 
chiefly on the producers dependent upon foreign outlets. 
The correctives that are mending the fabric of foreign trade 
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bear with ruthless severity upon American agriculture. Farm 
prices show the consequences 
The American manufacturer has one escape. He. can ex-
port his factory. The more efficient and resourceful busi-
nessmen, moreover, are availing themselves of this escape. 
About 2,000 American plants have been established abroad. 
Qbviously, this altemative is not open to hog, cotton and 
wheat farmers .. 
Another corrective is the influence of the depreciated cur-
rencies of other countries. They have resulted in a sharp 
downward separation of their internal prices away from ours 
in terms of gold. Such a separation of price levels tends to 
check our exports and stimulate imports. But the correc-
tive influence of depreciated currencies, too, has fallen chief-
ly on the exporter. It has become harder for him to sell 
abroad as a consequence. Imports have been less affected 
because most tariff's are specific duties, the protection of 
which increases relative to the value of the article imported 
when prices decline. 
As the cost of living abroad declines, more Americans are 
likely to spend their vacations in Europe. The expenditures 
of our tourists is an invisible import .and tends to relieve the 
scarcity of dollars abroad. Although this item may remain 
large and even expand ·when better times prevail, for the 
immediate future tourist expenditures may be expected to 
decrease. Observe, however, that of the several important ad-
justments taking place this one alone does not burden the 
American producer dependent upon foreign outlets. In fact, 
an increase in tourist expenditures bas the same effect as 
increasing imports. 
The influences of trade barriers abroad are self-evident. 
Import quotas, milling restrictions, import monopolies, ex-
change controls and all manner of tariff's-all of these are 
designed, primarily, to do one thing, namely, decrease our 
exports. To the extent that they are successful in reducing 
our exports they tend to correct our balance of payments. 
The movement of American industries to foreign countries, 
depreciated currencies, tourist expenditures and trade bar-
riers abroad are adjustments, if left to take their course, 
that will in due time reduce the exports of commodities from 
the United States enough to balance our intemational pay-
ments to fit our creditor position. Meanwhile, ruinously low 
prices. are forced upon agriculture and bankruptcy becomes 
well-nigh universal. At the same time our debtors abroad 
-foreign govemments, municipalities, corporations and citi-
zens using American capital-are forced to default. Is such 
a cure desirablet 
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But there is an alternative-increase imports. To bring this 
about involves a gradual, yet definite, scaling down of our tari:f! 
wall. A downward adjustment of tariffs would tend to throw 
some of the burden of reestablishing foreign trade upon pro-
tected industries. Some business dislocations would result. Man-
ufacturers at present supported by high and often prohibitive 
tariffs would have to meet foreign competition or shift into fields 
better suited to the economy of the United States. 
From a long trend national viewpoint this would be a desir-
able adjustment. Lowering tariffs to permit enough of an in-
crease in imports of diversified manufactures to make it possible 
for our farmers and export manufacturers to hold their foreign 
markets would do two things: (1) Maintain those industries that 
have in their production the greatest comparative advantage and 
(2) reduce those least effective in using American workers and 
resources. The ultimate result would be to raise the standard 
of living of the people of the United States. 
Prompt reduction of tariffs and the moderation of other trade 
barriers is highly desirable. This action is basic to the reestab-
lishment of our export trade, which, in turn, is basic to the 
restoration of the fundamental balance in our national eco-
nomic life. Farmers and other producers of raw materials must 
first receive an adequate price for their products before they 
are able to buy the products of our factories in adequate volume 
to restore business activity and employment in the cities. 
But desirable as it may be to lower tariffs it should be realized 
that this cannot be done in 1 or 2 years. . Even under the most 
favorable circumstances it will probably take from 5 to 10 years 
to effect a substantial reduction of prevailing domestic and for-
eign trade barriers. Then, too, serious dislocations would result 
if all tariffs were suddenly removed or even sharply reduced. 
There are many reasons why the process should be carried out 
gradually, the chief one being that it would give the tariff sup-
ported industries an opportunity to shift to more productive 
enterprises. :Meanwhile, what will happen to the American pro-
ducer who has lost his foreign market f Until our foreign trade 
is reestablished, that is, until imports are inereased, exports must 
be reduced. Therefore, temporarily at least, some plan to facili-
tate the orderly retreat" of our cotton, wheat, hog and tobacco 
producers is not only desirable but in all probability essential. 
While our national trade policies are being adjusted to :flt our 
creditor position, sight should not be lost of the fact that the 
American farmer is carrying most of the burden of the ad-
HAmong the various proposals designed to accomplish this end are 
the domestic allotment plans, governmental reforestation program, and 
measures whereby the government leases land In order to withdraw 
It, al least temporarily, out of cultivation. 
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justments now taking place; hence, they are entitled to first 
consideration in any relief program. 
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